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Abstract—Existing captcha solutions on the Internet are a
major source of user frustration. Game captchas are an in-
teresting and, to date, little-studied approach claiming to make
captcha solving a fun activity for the users. One broad form of
such captchas – called Dynamic Cognitive Game (DCG) captchas
– challenge the user to perform a game-like cognitive task
interacting with a series of dynamic images. We pursue a
comprehensive analysis of a representative category of DCG
captchas. We formalize, design and implement such captchas,
and dissect them across: (1) fully automated attacks, (2) human-
solver relay attacks, and (3) usability. Our results suggest that
the studied DCG captchas exhibit high usability and, unlike
other known captchas, offer some resistance to relay attacks, but
they are also vulnerable to our novel dictionary-based automated
attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
The abuse of the resources of online services using auto-
mated means, such as denial-of-service or password dictionary
attacks, is a common security problem. To prevent such abuse,
a primary defense mechanism is CAPTCHA [2] (denoted
“captcha”), a tool aimed to distinguish a human user from
a computer based on a task that is easier for the former but
much harder for the latter.
The most commonly encountered captchas today take the
form of a garbled string of words or characters, but many
other variants have also been proposed [26]. Unfortunately, ex-
isting captchas suffer from several problems. First, successful
automated attacks have been developed against many existing
schemes. For example, algorithms have been designed that can
achieve character segmentation with a 90% success rate [27].
Real world attacks have also been launched against captchas
employed by Internet giants [23], [28], [39].
Second, low-cost attacks have been conceived whereby
challenges are relayed to, and solved by, users on different
web sites or paid human-solvers in the crowd [13], [18], [24].
In fact, it has been shown that [33] such relay attacks are
much more viable in practice than automated attacks due to
their simplicity and low economical costs.
Third, the same distortions that are used to hide the under-
lying content of a captcha puzzle from computers can also
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severely degrade human usability [11], [49]. More alarmingly,
such usability degradation can be so severe on many occasions
that users get frustrated and give up using the services that
deploy captchas. Consequently, companies lose customers and
suffer economic losses [36].
Given these problems, there is an urgent need to consider
alternatives that place the human user at the center of the
captcha design. Game captchas offer a promising approach
by attempting to make captcha solving a fun activity for the
users. These are challenges that are built using games that
might be enjoyable and easy to play for humans, but hard for
computers.
In this paper, we focus on a broad form of game captchas,
called Dynamic Cognitive Game (DCG) captchas. This captcha
challenges a user to perform a game-like cognitive task
interacting with a series of dynamic images. Specifically,
we consider a representative DCG captcha category which
involves objects floating around within the images, and the
user’s task is to match the objects with their respective target(s)
and drag/drop them to the target location(s). A startup called
“are you a human” [4], [38] has recently been offering such
DCG captchas.
Besides promising to significantly improve user experience,
DCG captchas are an appealing platform for touch screen
enabled mobile devices (such as smartphones). Traditional
captchas are known to be quite difficult on such devices due
to their small displays and key/touch pads, while touch screen
games are much easier and already popular. Motivated by these
unique and compelling advantages of DCG captchas, we set
out to investigate their security and usability. Specifically, we
pursue a comprehensive study of DCG captchas, analyzing
them from three broad yet intersecting dimensions: (1) us-
ability, (2) fully automated attacks, and (3) human-solver relay
attacks. Our main contributions are as follows:
1) We formalize, design and implement four instances of
a representative category of DCG captchas. (Sections II
and III)
2) We conduct a usability study of these instances, eval-
uating them in terms of time-to-completion, error rates
and perceived usability. Our results indicate the overall
usability to be very good. (Section IV)
3) We develop a novel, fully automated framework to
ar
X
iv
:1
31
0.
15
40
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  6
 O
ct 
20
13
2attack these DCG captcha instances based on image
processing techniques and principles of unsupervised
learning. The attack is computationally efficient and
highly accurate, but requires building a dictionary to be
effective. (Section V)
4) We explore different variants of human-solver relay
attacks against DCG captchas. Specifically, we show that
the most simplistic form of relay attack (in line with
traditional captcha relay attack) reduces to a reaction
time task for the solver, and conduct a user study to
evaluate the performance of this attack. In general, our
results indicate that DCG captchas with mobile answer
objects offer some level of resistance to relay attacks,
differentiating them from other captchas. Our user study
may also be of independent interest in other human-
centered computing domains. (Section VI)
II. BACKGROUND
We use the term Dynamic Cognitive Game (DCG) captcha
to define the broad captcha schemes that form the focus of
our work. We characterize a DCG captcha as having the
following features: (1) dynamic because it involves objects
moving around in image frames; (2) either cognitive because it
is a form of a puzzle that relates to the semantics of the images
or image recognition because it involves visual recognition;
and (3) a game because it aims to make captcha solving task a
fun activity for the user. In this section, we discuss the security
model and design choices for DCG captcha, and present the
DCG captcha category and associated instances studied in this
paper.
A. Security Model and Design Choices
The DCG captcha design objective is the same as that
of captcha: a bot (automated computer program) must only
be able to solve captcha challenges with no better than a
negligible probability (but a human should be able to solve
with a sufficiently high probability).1
A pre-requisite for the security of a DCG captcha imple-
mentation (or any captcha for that matter) is that the responses
to the challenge must not be provided to the client machine in
clear text. For example, in a character recognition captcha, the
characters embedded within the images should not be leaked
out to the client. To avoid such leakage in the context of DCG
captchas, it is important to provide a suitable underlying game
platform for run-time support of the implemented captcha.
Web-based games are commonly developed using Flash and
HTML5 in conjunction with JavaScript. However, both these
platforms operate by downloading the game code to the client
machine and executing it locally. Thus, if these game platforms
were directly used to implement DCG captchas, the client
machine will know the correct objects and the positions of
their corresponding target region(s), which can be used by
the bot to construct the responses to the server challenges
relatively easily. This will undermine the security of DCG
captchas.
1 For example, target thresholds might limit bot success rates below 0.6%
[51], and human user success rates above 90% [15].
The above problem can be addressed by employing two
implementation strategies under different security models.
Model 1 involves encryption and obfuscation of the game
code which will make it difficult for the attacker (bot) on the
client machine to extract the game code and thus the correct
responses. Commercial tools, such as SWF Encrypt [3], exist
which can be used to achieve this functionality. This approach
works under a security model in which it is assumed that
the bot does not have the capability to learn the keys used
to decrypt the code and to deobfuscate the code. A similar
model where the attacker has only partial control over the
client machine has also been employed in prior work [42].
Model 2, on the other hand, does not restrict the capability of
the bot and allows it to completely control the client machine.
It draws from the paradigm of cloud gaming [45], which
keeps all the game logic and code on the server side, and
involves the server streaming the game output to the client
machine synchronized with any user input. Products offered
by companies, such as StreamMyGame [43] and Onlive [37],
demonstrate the feasibility of this approach.
The choice of game platform for a DCG captcha imple-
mentation depends upon the desired level of security and
performance. The encryption/obfuscation approach is more
efficient but provides a weaker level of security. The game
streaming approach is expected to be secure but may suffer
from latencies due to continuous streaming. It also imposes
certain overhead on the captcha server given that it uses “thin”
clients. In practice, we envision a game captcha service to
deploy a hybrid solution whereby the first approach is used
on medium/high latency clients and the second approach is
used on low latency clients (assuming latencies can not be
faked).
In our model, we assume that the implementation provides
continuous feedback to the user as to whether the objects
dragged and dropped to specific target region(s) correspond
to correct answers or not. The server also indicates when the
game successfully finishes, or times out. This feedback mech-
anism is essential from the usability perspective otherwise
the users may get confused during the solving process. The
attacker is free to utilize all of this feedback in attempting to
solve the challenges, but within the time-out. We also assume
that it is possible for the server to preclude brute force attacks,
such as when the attacker tries to drag and drop the regions
within the image exhaustively/repeatedly so as to complete
the game successfully. Such a detection is possible by simply
capping the number of drag/drop attempts per moving object.2
In addition to automated attacks, the security model for
DCG captchas (and any other captcha) must also consider
human-solver relay attacks [13], [33]. In fact, it has been
shown that such relay attacks are much more appealing to
the attackers than automated attacks currently due to their
2The “are you a human” DCG captcha implementation claims to adopt a
sophisticated (proprietary) mechanism, based on mouse events, to differen-
tiate human game playing activity from an automated activity. We did not
implement such a human-vs-bot behavioral analysis component because our
paper’s goal is to examine the underlying captcha scheme only. A behavioral
component can be added to other captchas also and represents a topic
orthogonal to our work. Besides, it is not clear if behavioral analysis would
add security; it may instead degrade usability by increasing false negatives.
3(a) Ships Game (b) Shapes Game
(c) Parking Game (d) Animals Game
Fig. 1: Static snapshots of 4 game instances of a representative
DCG captcha analyzed in this paper (targets are static; objects
are mobile)
simplicity and low cost [33]. In a relay attack, the bot
forwards the captcha challenges to a human user elsewhere
on the Internet (either a payed solver or an unsuspecting user
accessing a web-site [21]); the user solves the challenges and
sends the responses back to the bot; and the bot simply relays
these responses to the server. Unfortunately, most, if not all,
existing captcha solutions are insecure under such a relay
attack model. For example, character recognition captchas are
routinely broken via such relay attacks [33]. For DCG captchas
to offer better security than existing captchas, they should
provide some resistance to such human-solver relay attacks
(this is indeed the case as we demonstrate in Section VI).
B. Game Instances and Parameters
Many forms of DCG captchas are possible. For example,
they may be based on visual matching or semantic matching
of objects, may consist of multiple target objects or none at
all, and may involve static or moving targets. In this paper,
we focus on one representative category, and four associated
instances, of DCG captcha with static target(s) (see Figure 1).
Specifically, our studied DCG captcha instances involve:
1) single target object, such as place the ship in the sea
(the Ships game).
2) two target objects, such as match the shapes (the Shapes
game).
3) three target objects, such as feed the animals (the
Animals game).
4) no target objects, such as park the boat (the Parking
game), where the target area does not consist of any
objects.
The Shapes game is based on visual matching whereas the
other games involve semantic matching.
For each of these 4 instances, different parameterizations
affect security and usability. These include: (1) the number
of foreground moving objects, including answer objects and
other “noisy” objects; and (2) the speed with which the
objects move. The larger the number of objects and higher
the speed, the more difficult and time consuming it might
be for the human user to identify the objects and drag/drop
them, which may degrade usability. However, increasing the
number and speed of objects may also make it harder for a
computer program to play the games successfully, which may
improve security. Thus, for our analysis of the DCG captcha,
we will evaluate the effect of these parameters for captcha
usability and captcha security (against automated as well as
relay attacks).
III. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
Due to legal considerations, we did not resort to directly
evaluate an existing DCG captcha implementation (e.g., “are
you a human” DCG captchas). In particular, developing au-
tomated attacks against these captchas directly violates the
company’s asserted terms and conditions [5]. Instead, we
designed and implemented our own equivalent and generalized
versions of DCG captchas from scratch, and analyzed these
versions. Developing our own versions also allowed us to
freely vary the game parameters, such as the number and
speed of objects, and investigate the DCG captcha security
and usability with respect to these parameters.3
We created four instances of games as specified in Section
II-B using Adobe Flash. This follows Model 1 (Section II-A)
whereby the games reside locally on the client machine.
However, since our purpose was to analyze the implemented
captcha security against automated (image processing) attacks
and relay attacks (and not for leakage of information from
the client code itself), we did not encrypt or obfuscate our
captcha game implementation. All of our security analysis is
also generally applicable to Model 2.
The game image/frame size is 360 x 130 pixels, which can
easily fit onto a web page such as in a web form. Each game
starts by placing the objects in certain pre-specified locations
on the image. Then, each object picks a random direction in
which it will move. A total of 8 directions were used, namely,
N, S, E, W, NE, NW, SE and SW. If the chosen direction
is one of E, W, S, or N, the object will move (across X or
Y axis) by 1 pixel per frame in that direction. Otherwise,
the object will move
√
2 = 1.414 pixels per frame along the
hypotenuse, corresponding to 1 pixel across both X and Y
axes. This means that on an average the object moves 1.207 [=
(1∗4+1.414∗4)/8] pixels per frame. The object continues in
the current direction until colliding with another object or the
game border, whereupon it moves in a new random direction.
The game starts when the user presses a “Start” button
on the screen center. Each game briefly explains to users
their task, e.g., “Place the ships on the sea.” The game ends
when the user clicks/drags all the correct objects onto their
corresponding target(s), in which case a “Game Complete”
message is provided. To successfully match an object with
its target, the user clicks inside the bounding box across the
shape of the object, drags the object and drops it by releasing
it inside the bounding box across the respective target. The
game must be successfully completed within a fixed time (we
allow 60s); the user gets feedback on the correctness of every
3Although our implementation and analyses does not directly involve the
“are you a human” captchas, it is generalized enough for our results to be
applicable to these captchas also (i.e., the ones that fall under the categories
evaluated in our work).
4drag-drop, by a star on success and a cross on failure (Figure
8, Appendix A).
For each of the 4 games, we set 5 parameterizations,
choosing object speed (low, medium, high) as (10, 20, 40)
frames per second (FPS), and number of moving objects as
(4, 5, 6). (These frame rates translate into average object
speeds of 12.07, 24.14 and 48.28 pixels/second, resp., given
the objects move 1.207 pixels/frame.) For each game, we used
5 combinations of speed and number of objects: (10 FPS, 4
objects); (20 FPS, 4 objects); (20 FPS, 5 objects); (20 FPS, 6
objects); and (40 FPS, 4 objects). This resulted in a total of
20 games in our corpus.
IV. USABILITY
In this section, we report on a usability study of our
representative DCG captcha category.
A. Study Design, Goals, and Process
Our study involved 40 participants who were primarily
students from various backgrounds. (For demographics, see
Table I). The study was web-based and comprised of three
phases. The pre-study phase involved registering and briefly
explaining the participants about the protocols of the study. In
particular, the participants were shown “consent information,”
which they had to agree before proceeding with the study.
This was followed by collecting participant demographics and
then the participants playing the different DCG captcha games.
This actual study phase attempted to mimic a realistic captcha
scenario which typically involves filling out a form followed
by solving captcha. To avoid explicit priming, however, we
did not mention that the study is about captcha or security,
but rather indicated that it is about assessing the usability of a
web interface. In the post-study phase, participants answered
questions about their experience with the tested DCG captchas.
This comprised the standard SUS (Simple Usability Scale)
questions [8], a standard 10-item 5-point Likert scale (‘1’
represents “Strong disagreement” and ‘5’ represents “Strong
agreement”). SUS polls satisfaction with respect to computer
systems [6], in order to assess their usability. Additionally, we
asked several other questions related to the games’ usability.
In the actual study phase, each participant played 20 in-
stances as discussed in Section III, aimed at understanding how
different parameterizations impact users’ solving capabilities.
The order of games presented to different participants involved
a standard 20x20 Latin Square design to counter-balance
learning effects. Via our study, our goal was to assess the
following aspects of the DCG captchas:
1) Efficiency: time taken to complete each game.
2) Robustness: likelihood of not completing the game, and
of incorrect drag and drop attempts.
3) Effect of Game Parameters: the effect of the object speed
and number on completion time and error rates.
4) User Experience: participants’ SUS ratings and qualita-
tive feedback about their experience with the games.
For each tested game, completion times, and errors were
automatically logged by our web-interface software.
TABLE I: Usability Study Participant Demographics
N=40
Gender (%)
Male 50
Female 50
Age (%)
18 - 24 80
25 - 35 20
Education (%)
Highschool 45
Bachelors 27.5
Masters 22.5
Ph. D. 5
Profession / field of study (%)
Computer Science 60
Engineering 5
Science, Pharmaceuticals 10
Law 2.5
Journalism 2.5
Finance 2.5
Business 5
Others 12.5
B. Study Results
We now provide the results from our usability study, includ-
ing time to completion and error rates, as well as perceived
qualitative aspects of the methods based on user ratings.
Completion Time: Table II shows the completion time per
game type. Clearly, all games turned out to be quite fast,
lasting for less than 10s on an average. Users took longest
to solve the Animals game with an average time of 9.10s,
whereas the other games took almost half of this time. This
might have been due to increased semantic load on the users
in the Animals game to identify three target objects and then
match them with the corresponding answer objects. Moreover,
we noticed a decrease in the solving time (equal to 3.84s)
when the target objects were decreased to 2 (i.e., in the Shapes
game), and this time was comparable to games which had 1
target object in the challenge (Ships and Parking). A one-way
repeated-measures ANOVA test showed significant difference
(at 95% confidence) in the mean timings of all 4 types of
games (p < 0.0001, F = 79.98). Aalyzing further using
pairwise paired t-tests with Bonferroni correction, we found
significant difference between the mean times of following
pairs: Animals and Parking (p < 0.001), Ships and Shapes
(p < 0.0005), Animals and Ships (p < 0.001), Animals and
Shapes (p < 0.001), and Parking and Shapes (p = 0.0024).
TABLE II: Error rates per click and completion time per game
type
Game Type Completion Time (s)
mean (std dev)
Error Rate Per Click
mean
Ships 4.51 (1.00) 0.04
Animals 9.10 (0.96) 0.05
Parking 4.37 (0.90) 0.09
Shapes 5.26 (0.59) 0.03
Error Rates: An important result is that all the tested games
5yielded 100% accuracy (overall error rate of 0%). In other
words, none of the participant failed to complete any of the
games within the time out. This suggests our DCG captchas
instances are quite robust to human errors.
Next, we calculated the likelihood of incorrect drag and drop
attempts (error rate per click). For example, in the Animals
game, an incorrect attempt would be to feed the monkey with
a flower instead of a banana. We define the error rate per
click as the number of incorrect objects (from the pool of all
foreground objects) dragged to the target area divided by the
total number of objects dragged and dropped. The results are
depicted in Table II. We observe that the Shape game yields
the smallest average per click error rate of 3%. This suggests
that the visual matching task (as in the Shapes game) is less
error prone compared to the semantic matching task (as in
the other games). The game challenge which seemed most
difficult for participants was the Parking game (average per
click error rate 9%). Since objects in this game are relatively
small, participants may have had some difficulty to identify
them.
Effect of Object Speed and Number: Table III shows the
performance of the game captchas in terms of per click error
rates and completion time as per different object speeds. We
can see that the maximum number of per click errors were
committed at 10 FPS speed. Looking at the average timings,
we find that it took longest to complete the games when
the objects move at the fastest speed of 40 FPS, while 20
FPS yielded fastest completion time followed by 10 FPS.
ANOVA test revealed statistical difference among the mean
completion time corresponding to three speeds (p = 0.0045,
F = 5.65). Further analyzing using the t-test with Bonferroni
correction, we found statistical difference between the mean
timing corresponding to the following pair of speeds only: 10
FPS and 20 FPS (p = 0.0001).
TABLE III: Error rates per click and completion time per
object speeds
Object Speed Completion Time (s)
mean (std dev)
Error Rate Per Click
mean
10 FPS 5.74 (2.11) 0.06
20 FPS 4.90 (2.22) 0.05
40 FPS 6.53 (2.87) 0.04
Another aspect of the usability analysis included testing
the effect of increase in the number of objects (including
noisy answer objects) on the overall game performance. Table
IV summarizes the per click error rates and completion time
against different number of objects. Here, we can see a clear
pattern of increase, albeit very minor, in average completion
time and average rate with increase in the number of objects.
This is intuitive because increasing the number of objects
increases the cognitive load on the users which may slow down
the game play and introduce chances of errors. ANOVA test
did not indicate this difference to be significant, however.
User Experience: Now, we analyze the data collected from
the participants during the post-study phase. The average
SUS score came out to be 73.88 (standard deviation = 6.94).
Considering that the average SUS scores for user-friendly
TABLE IV: Error rates per click & completion time per # of
objects
# of Objects Completion Time (s)
mean (std dev)
Error Rate Per Click
mean
6 6.58 (1.69) 0.06
5 5.30 (2.28) 0.05
4 4.90 (2.22) 0.04
industrial software tends to hover in the 60–70 range [31],
the usability of our DCG game captcha instances can be rated
as high.
In addition to SUS, we asked the participants a few 5-
point Likert scale questions about the usability of the games
(‘1’ means “Strong Disagreement”). Specifically, we asked if
the games were “visually attractive” and “pleasurable,” and
whether they would like to use them in “practice.” Table V,
shows the corresponding average Likert scores. We found that
47% percent participants felt that the games were visually at-
tractive and 45% said that it was pleasurable to play the games.
These numbers indicate the promising usability exhibited by
the games. We further inquired users if they noticed change
in speed or number of objects in the games. 27.5% noticed no
change (increase and/or decrease) in speed of objects, whereas
only 22.5% noticed no change in number of objects (see Table
VI). Thus, the change in the number of objects and speed
(within the limits we tested) was noticeable by a large fraction
of participants.
TABLE V: User feedback on game attributes
Attribute Likert Score
mean (std dev)
Visually Attractive 3.18 (0.94)
Pleasurable 3.33 (0.96)
TABLE VI: % of users noticing change in speed and number
of objects
Object Speed (%)
Moved faster 30
Moved slower 5
No change 27.5
Both slower and faster 37.5
Number of objects (%)
Increased 47.5
Decreased 2.5
No change 22.5
Both increase and decrease 27.5
Summary of Usability Analysis: Our results suggest that the
DCG captcha representatives tested in this work offer very
good usability, resulting in short completion times (less than
10s), very low error rates (0% per game completion, and less
than 10% per drag and drop attempt),4 and good user ratings.
We found that increasing the object speed and number is likely
to degrade the game performance, but up to 6 objects and up
to 40 FPS speed yield a good level of usability. Although our
study was conducted with a relatively young participant pool,
4When contrasted with many traditional captchas [11], these timings are
comparable but the accuracies are significantly better.
6given the simplcity of the games (involving easy matching
and clicking tasks), we anticipate the game performance to be
generally in line with these results.5
V. AUTOMATED ATTACKS
Having validated, via our usability study, that it is quite easy
for the human users to play our DCG captcha instances, we
next proceeded to determine how difficult these games might
be for the computer programs. In this section, we present and
evaluate the performance of a fully automated framework that
can solve DCG captcha challenges based on image processing
techniques and principles of unsupervised learning. We start
by considering random guessing attacks and then demonstrate
that our framework performs orders of magnitude better than
the former.
A. Random Guessing Attack
An attacker given a DCG captcha challenge can always
attempt to perform a random guessing attack. Let us assume
that the attacker knows which game he is being challenged
with as well as the location of the target area (e.g., the blue
region containing the target circle and pentagon in the Shapes
game) and the moving object area (e.g., the white region in
the Shapes game within which the objects move). Although
determining the latter in a fully automated fashion is a non-
trivial problem (see our attack framework below), an attacker
can obtain this knowledge with the help of a human solver.
However, the attacker (bot) still requires knowledge of: (1)
the foreground objects (i.e., all the objects in the moving object
area) and (2) the target objects (i.e., the objects contained
within the target area). A randomized strategy that the attacker
could adopt is to pick a random location on the moving object
area and drag/drop it to a random location on the target area.
More precisely, the attacker can divide the moving object area
and the target area into grids of reasonable sizes so as to cover
the sizes of foreground moving objects and target objects. For
example, the moving object area can be divided into a 10
pixel x 10 pixel grid and target region can be divided into a 3
pixel x 3 pixel grid (given that the target area size is roughly
3 times the object area size). If there are a total of r target
objects, the total number of possibilities in which the cells
(possibly containing the answer objects) on the object area
can be dragged and dropped to the cells on the target area
are given by t = C(100, r) ∗ P (9, r). This is equivalent to
choosing r cells in the object area out of a total of 100 cells,
and then rearranging them on to 9 cells in the target area. Thus,
the probability of attacker success in solving the challenge
in a single attempt is 1/t. For the DCG captcha instances
targeted in this paper, r is 3, 2 and 1, resulting in the respective
success probabilities of 0.00000123%, 0.000281% and 0.1%.
Each attempt corresponds to r drag-and-drop events. Even if
the attacker is allowed a limited (3-4) number of attempts to
solve the captcha, these probabilities are still much lower than
the target probabilities for a real-world captcha system security
(e.g., 0.6% as suggested by Zhu et al. [51]).
5For example, “are you a human” FAQs also report similar timings for their
games, averaging 10-12s [4].
While this analysis suggests that such DCG captchas are
not vulnerable to naive guessing attacks, the next step is to
subject them to more sophisticated, fully automated attacks,
as we pursue below.
B. Our Automated Attack and Results
Our attack framework involves the following phases:
1) Learning the background image of the challenge and
identifying the foreground moving objects. A back-
ground is the canvas on which the foreground objects
are rendered. The foreground objects, for example, in
the Ships game, as shown in Figure 1(a), are bird, ship,
monkey, and squirrel.
2) Identifying the target area and the target area center(s).
For example, the sea in the Ships game, and the animals
in the Animals game.
3) Identifying and learning the correct answer objects. For
example, the ships in the Ships game.
4) Building a dictionary of answer objects and correspond-
ing targets, the background image, the target area and
their visual features, and later using this knowledge base
to attack the new challenges.
5) Continuously learning from new challenges containing
previously unseen objects.
Next, we elaborate upon our design and matlab-based im-
plementation per each attack phase as well as our experimental
results. We note that, on a web forum [1], the author claims
to have developed an attack against the “are you a human”
captcha. However, unlike our generalized framework, this
method is perfected for only one simple game that has one
single target area and a fixed set of answer objects. It is not
known whether or how easily this method can be adapted to
handle different games, games with multiple instances that
carry different sets of answer objects, and those with multiple
target areas. Since only one game is cracked, one needs to keep
refreshing the game page, if allowed, until that specific game
appears. Since no technical details are provided in [1], we can
only doubt if any background learning or object extraction is
implemented by observing the short time it takes to finish the
attack.
(1) Background & Foreground Object Extraction: To
extract the moving objects in the challenge, we developed a
background & foreground extraction technique. By subtracting
the background image from a video frame, the foreground
moving objects become readily extractable. In our approach,
40 frames captured at a fixed time interval (0.2s) are used to
learn the background image. For each pixel on the game scene,
its 40 observed color values are collected and a histogram
is built to select the most frequent color value (dominant
color) as the background color for that pixel. This is based
on the assumption that the background image is static and the
foreground objects are constantly moving, such that the true
background color almost always appears as the most frequent
(or consistent) color observed for a pixel. This approach
is computationally efficient and sufficiently accurate for our
purpose. To further reduce the computational cost, a 6-bit color
code rather than a 24-bit or 3-byte representation of a color
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Fig. 2: Detected backgrounds. (a)(b) The original game scenes
of the Shapes and Parking challenges; (c)(d) Detected back-
ground images in color codes
value, is used to code the video frame, the learned background
image, and the learned foreground objects.
Each learned background image is saved in the database.
After removing the extracted background from 5-8 equally
distant frames from the 40 initial frames, the objects in each
of the selected frame are extracted. The objects below a
certain size threshold were discarded as noise. The frame
with the maximum number of objects was then selected
to extract various objects. Using multiple frames for object
extraction also helped us discard the frames in which the
objects overlapped each other and were hence detected as a
single object instead of distinct individual objects.
Figure 2 shows two detected background images that are
represented in color codes of the Shapes and the Parking
games. One drawback of this method is that if the moving
speed of the foreground objects is too slow, especially when
some foreground objects hover over a small area, the dominant
color values of most pixels in that area will be contributed
by the foreground objects instead of by the background. A
shadow of foreground objects may appear as a pseudo patch
in the background image as shown in Figure 2(c), indicated by
a dashed rectangle. According to our experimental results, the
likelihood of observing such pseudo patches is sufficiently low
(< 7%). Even if there is any, one possible solution is to use
more frames for initial background learning. However, the time
cost is directly proportional to the amount of frames collected.
On the other hand, pseudo patches may not pose a big issue.
Even though the existence of pseudo patches may result in
over-segmented foreground objects when they overlap each
other, a partially detected object can still be used to extract
visual features and later to locate an object that matches the
visual features at the time of attacking. Yet there is another
possible solution that uses multiple running instances of the
same game to learn the background. The idea is to take full
advantages of the different initial configurations of a game
and utilize the variety in the set to construct a more reliable
background image. The overall learning time will be increased
but the individual learning time for each instance remains the
same, which avoids the failure case in which the game stops
before the background is fully learned.
As the final step as part of this phase, the visual features,
coded as color code histograms (a visual feature commonly
used to describe the color distribution in an image), of the
foreground objects and the background image, are stored in
the database, together with some other meta-data such as the
object size and dimensions.
(2) Target Area Detection: Identifying the target area requires
analysis of the background extracted in the previous phase.
For this purpose, we implemented two alternative approaches,
namely the Minimum Bounding Rectangle (MBR) [17] method
and the Edge-based method, and compared and contrasted
them with regard to detection accuracy and time efficiency.
The MBR-based method is based on the observation that
the activity/moving area of foreground objects has no or very
little overlap with the target area. Therefore, by detecting and
removing the foreground moving area from the background
image, a reasonable estimate of the target area can be obtained.
As the first step of this approach, the selected 5-8 frames
and their foreground object masks from the previous phase
are used to identify the foreground moving area mask. More
specifically, the foreground mask is generated by identifying
those pixels that have a different color code value than that
of the corresponding pixels in the background image. Then,
a Minimum Bounding Rectangle (MBR) is generated that
bounds the area where the foreground objects are detected
in the current frame (Figure 3). The final estimate of the
foreground moving area, denoted as MBRfinal, is the super-
imposition of all the MBRs extracted from the sample frames,
also represented as a minimum bounding rectangle (see Figure
3(c)).
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
  
Fig. 3: Target Detection. (a) The detected background for the
Parking challenge; (b) One sample frame represented in color
code; (c) Detected foreground objects from (b) and their MBR.
After the removal of the entire area bounded by MBRfinal
from the background image, the remaining background is
divided into eight sub-areas as shown in Figure 4. The sub-
area with the largest area (e.g., sub-area #2 in Figure 4) is
identified as the target area, and its centroid is the target center.
It is worth noting that the computational cost of this method is
very low (O(MN), where N is the number of pixels in a game
scene, M is the number of sample frames, and M  N ) since
the foreground object masks are readily available as part of
the output from the previous phase. In other words, the most
time consuming part, which is the extraction of foreground
objects (O(MN2)) from sample frames, has been covered in
8the previous phase.6
1 2 3
4 5
6 7 8
MBRfinal
Fig. 4: Eight sub-areas generated according to moving area of
foreground objects
The Edge-based method employs a different design prin-
ciple than MBR-based method. It is based on the hypothesis
that there are strong edges in the target area because of the
likely presence of objects in the target area, such as the dog
and the squirrel in the Animals game. The steps involved in
the edge-based method are listed below:
1) Collect a sequence of frames and learn the background
image as in the MBR-based method.
2) Detect edge pixels on the background image. Group
connected edge pixels into edge segments.
3) Remove trivial edge segments that have too few pixels
by a user-input threshold.
4) The mean of all the centroids of remaining segments is
used as the target area center.
The comparison results of the MBR-based and Edge-based
methods are shown in Figure 5. The solid square dot in each
game scene in Figure 5(a) is the MBR-detected target area
center for that challenge. Also displayed in Figure 5(a) are the
detected foreground object moving areas, namely MBRfinal,
displayed as a black rectangle in each game scene. According
to our experimental results, MBR-based method was able to
detect the correct target area center in all the challenges. In
contrast, for the edge-based method, it is difficult to find a
global threshold that works for all the challenges. Rather,
we need to adjust the threshold for a specific game in order
to achieve “reasonably good” results, and this method is
also sensitive to the existence of texts in the background.
Figure 5(b) shows the “optimal” edge detection result for each
challenge with a manually tuned threshold which is different
for each challenge. As shown in Figure 5(c), some target area
centers are incorrectly detected because some edge segments
belong to the texts that are part of the background but not of
the target area. This means that the accuracy of the edge-based
method could be significantly undermined by the presence of
strong edges in the background that are not part of the target
area (e.g., presence of texts) and the absence of objects in the
target area (e.g., the absence of objects in the target area of
the Ships Game). As for efficiency, the MBR-based method
has a time complexity of O(MN) where M is a constant
in the range of 5-8, while the time complexity of the edge-
based method is O(NL + N2) where L is a constant in the
range of 3-8 estimated based on the typical time complexity
of a non-combining edge detection method [44]. Overall, this
6We also implemented an alternative design, called the exclusion method
(see Appendix A), which detects the target area by simply removing fore-
ground object pixels accumulated from all the sample frames. However, while
this method is slightly faster than the MBR-based method, it is less robust.
Fig. 5: Comparison of the target area center detection results
between the MBR-based and the edge-based methods. (a)
Results from MBR-based method (solid square dot represents
the target area center and black rectangle represents the object
moving area); (b) centroids of non-trivial edges from the edge-
based method; and (c) final target area centers from the edge-
based method.
shows that the MBR method outperforms the Edge method on
several aspects.
(3) Answer Object & Target Location Detection: Once
the target area is identified, the next step is to identify the
correct answer objects and their respective matching sub-
target areas. Since a game can not have too many sub-target
areas (otherwise, usability will be compromised), we divide
the entire probable target area into 9 equal-sized blocks, each
represented by its area centroid, drag each foreground object
to each of the 9 centroids, and stop and record the knowledge
learned whenever there is a “match.” A match occurs when
an answer object is dragged to its corresponding sub-target
area (e.g., a “bone” dragged onto a “dog”). This is detected
by monitoring the change of the area summation of all the
foreground objects, since an answer object, once dragged to
its correct target location, will stay in the target area and
therefore result in a reduction of the foreground area. In our
experiments, this method has proven 100% effective when
applied to all four games. As for efficiency, while the worst
case upper bound is O(N), where N is the total number of
foreground objects, in practice, much less number of drags
are required. Our experimental results show that, with 5
foreground objects for each game (the maximum setting) and
15 training runs for each game, the average number of drags
needed for a game is 9, i.e., less than 2 drags per each object on
average. In case the server imposes a strict limit on drag/drop
attempts, this process can be repeated over mutiple runs.
(4) Knowledge Database Building and Attacking: The
background, target area, and learned answer objects as well
as their corresponding sub-target areas together constitute
the knowledge database for a game. After learning about
sufficient number of games, whenever a new game challenge
is presented, the knowledge base is checked for the challenge.
The target area of the currently presented challenge is matched
with the target areas present in the database to identify the
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from the foreground follows. The visual features such as the
color code histogram of the currently extracted objects are
matched with that of the answer objects in the database for that
challenge. The extracted objects identified as correct answer
objects are then dragged to their corresponding sub-target
areas. To measure the performance of our approach, we ran
this attacking module 100 times for each game instance, and
the average successful attacking time is 6.9s with the number
of foreground objects ranging from 4 to 6. The maximum
successful attacking time is 9.3s, observed for an instance of
the Animal game with 6 foreground objects. These timings are
in line with those exhibited by honest users in our usability
study, which will make it impossible for the captcha server to
time-out our attack.
(5) Continuous Learning: During attacking, if a challenge
matches a game in our database but contains previously unseen
answer object(s) (e.g., a new ship object in a Ships game
instance), the attack will not terminate successfully. Whenever
such a situation arises, an answer object learning module that
is similar to the aforementioned module is activated, but differs
from the latter in that it only needs to drag a potential answer
object to each of the previously learned sub-target areas that
have matching answer objects in the database. The newly
learned answer objects and their corresponding sub-target area
centroids are then added to the knowledge base for that game.
C. Discussion and Summary
Though background learning is the most time-consuming
process in our framework (it took on an average 30.9s when
we ran this module 15 times per game instance), there are
two benefits that it provides. First, the learned background
can be used to quickly extract foreground moving objects.
Second, the learned background can be used to locate the target
area where foreground answer objects need to be dragged
to. Our background learning method has a fixed learning
time, but further improvements on both the efficiency and
accuracy can be devised. For example, the learning can be
terminated whenever sufficient observation data is collected
for all background pixel values. This will significantly reduce
the learning time for those games in which foreground objects
move reasonably fast, but may not help with improving the
learning efficiency for games with slow-moving objects.
The adoption of a large image database for each answer
object could pose a challenge to our approach since it al-
lows for the creation of many different foreground answer
object configurations for the same game. In the worst case, a
challenge may contain none of the previously learned answer
objects for that particular game. Continuous learning will be
activated in such cases and can also be used as a way for auto
attacking in the run time. Such cases fall into the category of
“known foreground answer objects and known target objects,”
and the success rate can be estimated using the number of
foreground objects (o), number of answer objects (t), and
number of drag and drop attempts allowed for each object
(a). For example, if o = 5, t = 3 and a = 2, the success rate
is approximately 2
3
C(5,3)3! = 13%. Though as low as it seems,
the rate itself is not affected by the image database size.
During attacking, there is a time lapse between selecting
a foreground object and verifying whether it is an answer
object. Both feature extraction and database lookup (through
feature matching) take time. In our implementation, we chose
to click and hold a selected object until a match with an
answer object in the database is registered. In doing so, we
guarantee that an answer object, once verified, can be readily
dragged and dropped, thus to avoid dealing with the issue of
constantly moving objects. However, this approach may fail
if a constraint is added by the captcha implementation that
limits the amount of time one can hold an object from moving.
A less invasive attacking method would be to utilize parallel
processing, in which one thread is created to perform feature
extraction and comparison, and another parallel thread is used
to track and predict the movement of the object currently under
verification.
Summary of Automated Attack Analysis: Our attack rep-
resents a novel approach to breaking a representative DCG
captcha category. Attacking captcha challenges, for which the
knowledge already exists in the dictionary, is 100% accurate
and has solving times in line with that of human users.
However, building the dictionary itself is a relatively slow
process. Although this process can be sped-up as we discussed,
it may still pose a challenge as the automated attack may
need to repeatedly scan the different captcha challenges from
the server to continuously build an up-to-date dictionary. The
defense strategies for the DCG captcha designers may thus
include: (1) incorporating a large game database as well as
large object image databases for each game; and (2) setting
a lower game time-out (such as 20-30s) within which human
users can finish the games but background learning does not
fully complete. Since our attack relies on the assumption that
the background is static, another viable defense would be
to incorporate a dynamically changing background (although
this may significantly hurt usability). It is also important to
note that, as per the findings reported in [33], the use of
fully automated solving services represent economical hurdles
for captcha attackers. This applies to traditional captchas as
well as DCG captchas. Eventually, this may make automated
attacks themselves less viable in practice [33], and further
motivates the attacker, similar to other captchas, to switch to
human-solver attacks against DCG captchas.
VI. RELAY ATTACKS
Human-solver relay attacks are a significant problem facing
the captcha community, and most, if not all, existing captchas
are completely vulnerable to these attacks routinely executed
in the wild [33]. In this section, we assess DCG captchas w.r.t.
such attacks.
A. Difficulty of Relaying DCG captchas
The attacker’s sole motivation behind a captcha relay attack
is to completely avoid the computational overhead and com-
plexity involved in breaking the captcha via automated attacks.
A pure form of a relay attack, as the name suggests, only
requires the attacker to relay the captcha challenge and its re-
sponse back and forth between the server and a human-solver.
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For example, relaying a textual captcha simply requires the
bot to (asynchronously) send the image containing the captcha
challenge to a human-solver and forward the corresponding
response from the solver back to the server. Similarly, even
video-based character recognition captchas [35], [46] can be
broken via a relay attack by taking enough snapshots of the
video to cover the captcha challenge (i.e., the distorted text
within the video) which can be solved by remotely located
humans. They can also be broken by simply taking a video
of the incoming frames and relaying this video to the human-
solver.
In contrast, DCG captchas offer some level of resistance to
relay attacks, as we argue in the rest of this section. In making
this argument, we re-emphasize that the fundamental motivat-
ing factors for a human-solver relay attacker are simplicity and
practicality. As such, a relay attack that requires sophistication
(e.g., special software, complexity and overhead), is likely not
going to work in practice [33].
There appears to be a few mechanisms using which DCG
captchas could potentially be subject to a relay attack. First, if
the server sends the game code to the client (bot) (Model 1),
the bot may simply ship the code off to the human-solver, who
can complete the game as an honest user would. However, in
Model 1, the game code is obfuscated and can be enforced
to be executable only in a specific domain/host (e.g., only
the client machine challenged with the captcha) authorized by
the server using existing tools7, which will make this attack
difficult, if not impossible.
The second possibility, called Stream Relay, is for the bot
to employ a streaming approach, similar to cloud gaming [45].
For example, in Model 2, the bot can synchronously relay the
incoming game stream from the server over to the solver, and
then relay back the corresponding clicks made by the solver
to the server. Although the Stream Relay attack might work
and its possibility can not be completely ruled out, it presents
two main practical obstacles for the attacker:
1) Overhead and Complexity: The bot must be programmed
(a) as a game streaming server (which involves the
overhead and complexity of processing, encoding or
compressing incoming frames), or (b) as a router which
needs to “sniff” raw networking packets (which may not
be permitted on a compromised non-root user account).
((a) and (b) may also be detected by an IDS running on
the machine compromised by bot)
2) Latencies: Streaming or routing a large number of game
frames over a (usually) slow connection between the bot
(e.g., based in the US) and the solver’s machine (e.g.,
based in China) would degrade the game performance
(similar to video streaming over slow connections),
reducing solving accuracy and increasing response time.
Such differences from an average honest user game play
session may further be used to detect the attack.
It is also important to note that the Stream Relay attack
represents a significant shift from a traditional captcha relay
attack, which may defeat the motivation for pursuing a relay
attack in the first place.
7http://www.kindi.com/swf-encryption.php
This motivates us to consider another much simpler relay
attack approach called Static Relay. Here, the bot asyn-
chronously relays a static snapshot of the game to a human-
solver and uses the responses (locations of answer objects and
that of the target objects) from the solver to break the captcha
(i.e., drag and drop the object locations provided by the solver
to the target object locations provided by the solver).
The Static Relay attack approach is very simple and in
line with a traditional captcha attack (and thus represents a
viable relay attack). However, it is expected to have poor
success rates. The intuitive reason behind this is a natural
loss of synchronization between the bot and the solver, due
to the dynamic nature of DCG captchas (moving objects). In
other words, by the time the solver provides the locations of
target object and the answer objects within a challenge image
(let us call this the nth frame), the objects themselves would
have moved in the subsequent, kth, frame (k > n), making
the prior responses from the solver of no use for the bot
corresponding to the kth frame. Recall that the objects move
in random directions and often collide with other objects and
game border, and therefore it would not be possible for the
bot to predict the location of an object in the kth frame given
the locations of that object in the nth frame (n < k). Such a
loss of synchronization will occur due to: (1) communication
delay between the bot and human solver’s machine, and (2)
the manual delay introduced by the solver him/herself in
responding to the received challenge. Figure 6 shows such
a desynchronization in attempting to relay a DCG captcha.
Human Solver 
3. Marked the answer object (xn, yn) and its target object
CAPTCHA 
Implementation
Bot 
(client machine)
2. nth frame in the CAPTCHA challenge 
5. Object is at (xk, yk);
but response is (xn, yn)  Reject
Fig. 6: Difficulty of succeeding at the Static Relay attack
A determined Static Relay attacker (bot) against the DCG
captcha can, however, attempt to maximize the level of syn-
chronization with the solver. Although it may not possible for
the attacker to minimize (ideally, eliminate) the communica-
tion delays (especially for bots potentially thousand of miles
away from human solvers), it may be possible to minimize the
manual delay via the introduction of carefully crafted tasks for
the human-solver. In the rest of this section, we report on an
experiment and the results of an underlying user study in order
to evaluate the feasibility of Static Relay attack against our
DCG captcha instances. This novel experiment takes the form
11
of a reaction time or reflex action task for the human-solver. A
reaction time task involves performing some operation as soon
as a stimulus is provided. A common example is an athlete
starting a race as quickly as a pistol is shot. The subject of
reaction time has been extensively studied by psychologists
(see Kosinski’s survey [30]).
B. Reaction Time Static Relay Experiment
Our hypothesis is that DCG captchas will be resistant to the
Static Relay attack, and so we give the attacker a strong power
in the following sense: our tests eliminate the communication
delay between the bot and the human solver, by putting them
on the same machine. The focus of the experiment then
shifts towards motivating human-solvers to perform at their
best by employing meaningful interfaces and by framing the
underlying task in a way that is amenable to these solvers.
In particular, since attacker’s goal is to minimize the delay
incurred by the human solver in responding to the challenges,
we model human-solver attack as a reaction time [30] task
described below. Our Section VI-C study further facilitates
the attacker with human solvers having low response times
and quick reflex actions, such as youths in their 20s [30].
Experimental Steps: The reaction time Static Relay attack
experiment consists of the following steps:
1) A snapshot of the game challenge is extracted by the bot
(B), and the human solver (H) is asked to identify/mark
a target object for that game challenge (e.g., the dog in
the Shapes game).
2) For each target object identified above, H is asked
to identify one answer object in the snapshot specific
to the game challenge (e.g., bone for the dog in the
Shapes game). However, since B wants to minimize
the delay between the time the challenge snapshot is
given and the response is received from H, a stimulus
will be associated with the snapshot. We make use of a
combination of (1) a visual stimulus (the border across
the game window flashes in Red) and (2) an audio
stimulus (a beeping sound). The task for H is to identify
an answer object in the image as soon as the stimuli are
provided.
3) B will emulate the dragging and dropping of the objects
based on the response of H (simply use the pixel values
provided by H as the coordinates of the objects and
respective targets).
4) Steps 2-3 are repeated until all answer objects for a given
target object are identified by H and dragged/dropped by
B.
5) Step 1 is repeated until all target objects have been
covered.
The experiment succeeds if the captcha game completes
successfully, i.e., if all answer objects are dragged to their
respective targets by B per input from H.
Experimental Implementation: Our implementation of the
above experiment consists of a user interface (UI) developed
in Java that interacts with the human solver and a bot. The
core of this implementation is designed using an algorithm
following which the screen captures are updated and displayed
on the screen as well as an algorithm used to make the mouse
drag and drop of the objects.
The game starts by the bot capturing an image of the game
challenge from the browser (i.e., the captcha challenge that the
bot received from the server) and displays that image in the
UI. The solver is then asked to click on a target object within
that image. After selecting the target, the solver is instructed
to click a “Next” button, wait for a flashing and a beep (our
stimuli), followed by clicking the object that matches with that
target. Once the solver has clicked on the object, the bot takes
control of the mouse by clicking and dragging the object to the
target in the flash game. The solver must be able to identify
and choose the correct object before the object has moved too
far in the flash game displayed in the browser. Whether the
click is successful or not, a new screen capture is retrieved
from the game on the browser. If the solver has chosen the
object in time on the UI, then he/she can pick a new target
if one exists by clicking on the “New Target” button. If the
solver has missed clicking on the object fast enough (i.e., if
the click was not successful), the solver will automatically get
another attempt to choose the correct object followed by the
flashing and the beep. Figure 9, Appendix A depicts the UI
of our implementation.
C. Static Relay Attack User Study
We now report on a user study of the aforementioned
reaction time relay attack experiment presented in Section
VI-B.
1) Study Design, Goals and Process: In the relay attack
study, users were given the task to play our 4 game instances
through the UI (described above). The study comprised of 20
participants, primarily Computer Science university students.
This sample represents a near ideal scenario for an attacker,
given that young people typically have fast reaction times [30],
presumably optimizing the likelihood of the success of the
relay attack. The demographics of the participants are shown
in Table VII. The study design was similar to the one used
in our usability study (Section IV). It comprised of three
phases. The pre-study phase involved registering and briefly
explaining the participants about the protocols of the study.
This was followed by collecting participant demographics and
then the participants playing the games via our interface.
The participants were told to perform at their best in playing
the games. The post-study phase required the participants to
respond to a set of questions related to their experience with
the games they played as part of the interface, including the
SUS questions [8].
Each participant was asked to play the relay versions
corresponding to each of the 20 variations of the 4 DCG
captcha games as in Section III; we used ordering based on
Latin squares, as in the usability study. The specific goal of
our study was to evaluate the reaction time experiment UI in
terms of the following aspects:
1) Efficiency: time taken to complete the games (and suc-
ceeding at the relay attack).
2) Robustness: likelihood of not completing the game (relay
attack failure), and incorrect drags/drops.
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TABLE VII: Relay Attck User Study Participant Demograph-
ics
N=20
Gender %
Male 70
Female 30
Age %
18 - 24 35
25 - 35 60
35 - 50 5
Education %
Highschool 25
Bachelors 45
Masters 30
Ph. D. 0
Profession / field of study %
Computer Science 90
Engineering 5
Medicine 5
3) User Experience: quantitative SUS ratings and qualita-
tive feedback from the participants.
4) Reaction time: Time delay between the presentation of
the stimuli and the response from the participant. This
is a fundamental metric for the feasibility of the attack.
If reaction time is large, the likelihood of attack success
will be low.
Another important goal of our user study was to compare
its performance with that of the usability study. If the two
differ significantly, the relay attack can be detected based on
this difference.
For each tested game, completion times and errors were
automatically logged by the our web-interface software. In
addition, we maintained “local logs” of the clicks made by
the participants on our game interface to measure the reaction
timings.
2) Study Results: We present various mechanical data, i.e.,
time to completion and error rates as part of the relay attack
study. We further analyze the local logs for the reaction time
analysis.
Completion Time and Error Rates: Table VIII shows the
time taken and error rates to play the games for each game
type by different participants. Unlike our usability study, many
game instances timed out, i.e., the participants were not able to
always complete these game instances within the time out of
60s. In this light, we report two types of timings: (1) successful
time, which is the time only corresponding to the games that
the participants were able to complete successfully within the
time out, and (2) overall time, which is the time corresponding
to both the game instances completed successfully within
the time out and those which timed out (in which case we
consider the timing to be 60s). The overall time therefore will
effectively be higher.
All games turned out to be quite slow, and much slower than
that of the usability study where the games lasted for less than
10s on an average (Section IV). As in our usability study, we
found that users took longest to solve the Animals (overall
average: 46.51s), whereas the other games took slightly less
time. This might have been due to the increased semantic
load in the Animals game due to the presence of 3 target
objects. We observed that the error rates were the highest for
the Animals game (40%), and the least for the Shapes games
(9%) although the corresponding per click error rates were
high (56%). The Ships and Parking games had comparable
overall error rates between 20-30%. We analyzed and further
compared the mean time for different game categories. Using
the ANOVA test, the games showed statistically different
behavior from each other (F = 12.85, p < 0.0001). On further
analyzing the data, we found the following pairs of games to
be statistically different from each other: Shapes and Ships
(p = 0.027) and Animals and all other games (p < 0.001).
To analyze errors better, we investigated error rates per
click, i.e. for each drag attempt whether the object being
dragged was dropped at the correct position or not. The error
rate per click was the least for the Ships game (17%), much
lower compared to all other games (50-70%), the latter itself
being much higher than observed during the usability study.
This suggests that the server could prevent the relay attack
against Animals, Parking and Shapes games by simply capping
the number of drag/drop attempts.
TABLE VIII: Error rates and completion time per game type
Game
Type
Overall Time
(s)
Successful time
(s)
Error
Rate
Error Rate
Per click
mean (std dev) mean (std dev) mean mean
Ships 30.92 (5.91) 22.25 (5.04) 0.26 0.17
Animals 46.51 (5.05) 37.93 (4.91) 0.40 0.65
Parking 28.16 (7.36) 20.45 (5.04) 0.22 0.66
Shapes 26.19 (1.59) 22.94 (1.74) 0.09 0.56
Reaction Time: We now analyze the reaction time correspond-
ing to different games during the relay attack experiments. We
consider two types of reaction times, one corresponding to all
clicks made by the participants, and the other corresponding to
only the correct clicks (i.e., those that resulted in a correct drag
and drop). The averaged results for the two types of reaction
times for each game type are summarized in Table IX. We
can see that the average reaction time (all clicks) for all game
categories was more than 2s and the least for the Shapes
game (2.17s). The average reaction time (correct clicks) is
slightly lower than reaction time (all clicks), but still higher
than 1.5s and still lowest for the Shapes game (1.62s). Neither
types of reaction times change significantly across different
game categories. ANOVA test, however, did find significant
difference between the mean reaction time (all clicks) of the
four games (F = 13.19, p < 0.01). On further analyses using
paired t-tests with Bonferroni correction, we found that there
was a significant difference between the Animals and Parking
games (p < 0.01). Similarly, using the ANOVA test, we found
significant difference between the mean reaction time (correct
clicks) (F = 3.24, p < 0.027). Further, we found a significant
difference between the Shape and Ship games (p < 0.005)
with respect to mean reaction time (correct clicks).
User Experience: We now consider the data collected via
direct user responses during the post-study phase. The average
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TABLE IX: Reaction times per game type
Game
Type
Reaction Time
All Clicks (s)
Reaction Time Cor-
rect Clicks (s)
mean (std dev) mean (std dev)
Ships 2.27 (0.34) 2.06 (0.17)
Animals 2.58 (0.35) 1.85 (0.23)
Parking 2.50 (0.51) 2.00 (0.31)
Shapes 2.17 (0.2) 1.62 (0.11)
SUS score from the study came out to be only 49.88 (std
dev = 5.29). This is rather low given that average scores
for commerical usable systems range from 60-70 [31], and
suggests a poor usability of the system. This means that it
would be difficult for human users to perform well at the relay
attack task and implies that launching relay attacks against
DCG captchas can be quite challenging for an attacker.
Table X shows the 5-point Likert scores (‘1’ is “Strong
Disagreement”; ‘5’ is “Strong Agreement”) for the visual
appeal and pleasurability of the games. Although the former
average ratings are on the positive side (more that 3), the
latter ratings are low, suggesting the participants did not find
the games to be pleasurable. In our games, we made use of
visual and audio stimuli to which the users had to respond.
In order to understand what type of stimulus worked best
for the participants, we asked them to what extent the audio,
visual or both stimuli together was useful as an indicator to
respond fastest to the game. These ratings are depicted in
Table X. The responses were on average in favor of the visual
stimulus, followed by the two stimuli together, and finally
the audio stimulus. 35% participants found audio stimulus
and visual stimulus to be sufficient whereas 45% participants
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that both visual
and audio stimulus are necessary to play the game. We further
performed the ANOVA test for responses corresponding to the
three – visual, audio and visual+audio – stimuli, but did not
find a statistically significant difference. Finally, 80% of the
participants felt that training will help them play the games
better with an average score of 3.95. This suggests an attacker
might improve success in relay attack through advance training
of human solvers.
TABLE X: Participant Feedback Summary
Features Likert Mean (std dev)
Visually Attractive 3.20 (0.92)
Pleasurable 2.85 (0.99)
Visual Stimulus 3.20 (1.17)
Audio Stimulus 2.95 (0.93)
Both Audio and Visual 3.10 (1.25)
Need Training 3.95 (1.01)
Summary of Relay Attack Analysis: Our analysis suggests
that subjecting the DCG captcha to relay attacks poses signif-
icant challenges. Either the relay attack becomes complex for
the bot (e.g., Stream Relay) or it remains to be very simple for
the bot but becomes very difficult for the human-solver (Static
Relay). Specifically, for the Static Relay attack to succeed, it
is necessary for the human solver to perform a reaction time
task (average reaction time is more than 2s). This task, except
for the Shapes game, takes much longer (> about 30s on
average), is significantly more error prone (error rates more
than 20%; per click error rates more than 50%), and much
harder for the users when compared to directly playing the
games by honest users under a non-relay attack setting. These
numbers only represent a lower bound. In real life, where the
communication delays between the bot and solver’s machine
will be non-zero, and average solver population samples are
used (unlike our attack set-up), the timings and error rates
will be higher and launching a relay attack would be even
more difficult. Although our experiments were conducted on
our 4 DCG captcha instances, we believe that our analysis
is generally applicable to other DCG captcha types involving
moving answer objects.
VII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review prior work and provide a taxon-
omy on captchas. For details, we refer the reader to [46], [7],
[26]. Figure 7 depicts the captcha taxonomy extending earlier
classifications
CR IR 
COG 
AUD 
dynamic 
images 
static 
images 
text-only  
cues 
audio 
cues 
CR-static 
IR-static 
CR-dynamic 
IR-dynamic 
MIOR 
DCG 
IC 
COG-word 
DIRG 
G 
IINT 
CR: character recognition 
IR: image recognition 
IC: image classification 
COG: cognitive 
AUD: audio 
IINT: image interactive   
G: game captchas   
DCG: dynamic cognitive games 
DIRG: dynamic image recognition games 
Fig. 7: Captcha Taxonomy
Character-recognition (CR) captchas are the most common
today, requiring users to input alphanumeric characters cor-
responding to distorted or obscured strings. Attacks [12],
[47], [48] typically involve optical character recognition tools,
with security relying heavily on the difficulty of character
segmentation. Image recognition (IR) captchas [51] involve
images or objects, other than alphanumeric characters, with
the user requiring to identify or recognize certain objects as
distinct from others. For example in Asirra [22], [25], cats are
distinguished from dogs. We identify image classification (IC)
captchas as a separate category – in many ways similar to IR
captchas, but with main task being classification (involving
cognitive effort or reasoning based on image semantics) more
than simple recognition. This is motivated by experience in
computer vision indicating classification to be much more
difficult than recognition [46].
Captchas involving images (including of text) can be sub-
divided based on the images being static or dynamic. The
moving-image object recognition (MIOR) sub-category [46]
includes, e.g., NuCaptcha [35] and emergent images [32].
IC captchas are a sub-category of cognitive (COG) captchas,
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which include text-based puzzles (e.g., leveraging language
constructs or word semantics), logic questions, and seman-
tic tasks related to images (e.g., content-based tagging of
YouTube videos [29]. Naor [34] anticipated many COG
schemes.
Many recent proposals are image-interactive (IINT)
captchas, wherein users interact with static or dynamic images
by clicks, screen touches, or drag/drop actions (e.g., [14],
[19], [40], [50]). Of particular interest to our present work
is the game-based (G) captcha subcategory, in which we
identify further sub-classes: dynamic cognitive games (DCG),
and dynamic image-recognition games (DIRG). Motivated by
vision-impaired users, audio captchas (AUD) [9], [10], [41],
is another major category, but it suffers both usability and
security problems [9], [10].
The captcha literature includes work on robustness [15],
[16], [51] and guidelines [12], [26], [49]. Studies on the
outsourcing of captcha solutions, cheap labor, captcha farms,
and the use of Mechanical Turk [11], [20], [33] lead to serious
questions about limitations—captchas were originally intended
to distinguish humans from computers, not legitimate users
from other humans willing to cheaply solve them, or tricked
into solving them through relay attacks.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper represents the first academic effort towards inves-
tigating the security and usability of game-oriented captchas in
general and DCG captchas in particular — a recent approach
aimed at eliminating user frustration common to traditional
captchas. Our overall findings are mixed. On the positive side,
our results suggest that DCG captchas, unlike other known
captchas, offer some level of resistance to relay attacks. We
believe this to be a significant advantage of these captchas
given that other captchas are routinely broken via relaying.
Furthermore, the studied representative DCG captcha category
demonstrated high usability. On the negative side, however, we
have also shown this category to be vulnerable to a dictionary-
based automated attack. Prior to our work, the community
view [33] for captchas in general was that fully automated
attacks are — due to economic reasons — less appealing to
real-world captcha attackers than human-solver relay attacks.
In contrast, our work shows that for DCG captchas, the
opposite might be true, due to the difficulty of relaying DCG
captchas — thus making these captchas an interesting area for
further study and evolution.
An immediate consequence of the insights borne out from
our study is that further research on DCG captchas could
concentrate on making these captchas better resistant to au-
tomated attacks while maintaining a good level of usability.8
Moreover, our paper focused on “pure automated” and “pure
relay attacks.” However, different forms of hybrid attacks can
be envisioned, which carefully combine the computing power
and human knowledge to undermine the security of DCG
captchas. Future research is necessary to investigate how well
8Any modifications made to the original DCG captchas to resist automated
attacks, such as a dynamic background, may further make relay attacks more
difficult.
hybrid attacks work, and how they alter the economics of
captcha-solving (following up [33]). Finally, the results of our
user study on reaction-time task performance may have general
applications in human-centered computing (security and non-
security) domains. For instance, these results may rule out the
possibility of usable captcha schemes themselves based on a
reaction-time test.
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APPENDIX
A. ADDITIONAL FIGURES AND TABLES
(a) A star indicating correct object
match
(b) A cross indicating incorrect ob-
ject match
Fig. 8: User Feedback per Game Interaction
(a) The solver is asked to choose a target
object
(b) The solver is asked to choose the next
answer object, if any
(c) The solver is asked to select a new
target object, if any
Fig. 9: User interface implementing the reaction time relay
experiment (95 represents the User ID; the red rectangle in
(c) represents our visual stimulus)
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B. TARGET AREA DETECTION USING THE EXCLUSION
METHOD
A design alternative for target area detection, called the
exclusion method is to detect the target area by simply
removing foreground object pixels accumulated from all the
sample frames. However, while this alternative is slightly faster
but still at about the same time efficiency as the MBR-based
method, it is less robust than the latter especially when the
objects are moving slow such that the remaining area, i.e., the
detected target area, may include too much of the foreground
object moving area that has not had a chance to be covered by
the footprints of foreground objects extracted from the limited
set of sample frames. Figure 10 shows our experimental results
for this design alternative applied to four different challenges,
where the blue dots represent the detected target area centers.
This alternative method failed to detect the correct target center
in all four cases.
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Fig. 10: The target area centers detected by exclusion method
